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ABSTRACT 
 
The unprecedented demand for performance in the latest technologies will ultimately require 
changes in the way we design cache. Emerging high density embedded memories such as Spin-
Transfer Torque Random Access Memory (STTRAM) have emerged as a possible candidate for 
universal memory due to its high speed, low power, non-volatility, and low cost. Although attractive, 
STTRAM is susceptible to contactless tampering through malicious exposure to magnetic field with 
the intention to steal or modify the bitcell content. In this thesis, we explore various attack techniques 
on STTRAM and then propose a novel array-based sensor to detect the polarity and magnitude of 
such attacks and then propose two design techniques to mitigate the attack. With our research, we 
have been able to successfully implement and accurately detect an attack while providing sufficient 
compensation window (few ns to ~100 us) to enable proactive protection measures. Finally, we show 
that variable-strength ECC can adapt correction capability to tolerate failures with various strength 
of an attack.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION1 
 
The market for nonvolatile memory has grown tremendously over the past few years. 
Among the nonvolatile memory types, flash memory has been in high demand as the market for 
portable device greater than before. However, flash memory technology has begun reaching its 
limitation as technology sizes decrease and researchers have begun exploring other options. Some 
limitations include short data retention time, limited numbers of read and write cycle, and 
reliability issue respected to low size scaling. As of result, recent researchers have been focusing 
on the possible new architectures and materials for low power, high density, and non-volatile 
characteristic so called the “Universal Memory” [7-8]. 
Emerging memory technologies such as Spin-Transfer Torque RAM (STT-RAM) [1], 
Domain Wall Memory (DWM), Resistive RAM (ReRAM), and Memrister [4] have been on high 
interest among researchers. Out of these listed technologies, STTRAM has been widely considered 
to be a suitable candidate for the possible Universal Memory. STT-RAM is an energy efficient 
modification of Magnetic RAM (MRAM), where the switching of the magnetization is through 
current induced spin-transfer torque [1]. STT-RAM offers fast and low power switching via use 
of spin-polarized current, potential density that can be close to DRAM levels, high endurance and 
excellent retention time.  
 
                                                           
1 Portions of this chapter were previously published in [16]. Permission is included in Appendix A. 
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1.1 Spin-Transfer Torque Random Access Memory 
Spin-Transfer Torque RAM (STTRAM) is a promising memory technology due to high 
speed, low power, non-volatility, and low cost. The commercialization of Magnetic RAM 
(MRAM) has fueled the development of STTRAM further as the potential future memory 
technology. STTRAM is an energy-efficient modification of MRAM [2], where the switching of 
the magnetization is accomplished through current induced spin-transfer torque. STTRAM offers 
fast and low-power switching via use of spin-polarized current. Due to density closer to DRAM, 
speed closer to SRAM, high endurance and superb retention time, STTRAM is widely considered 
to be a suitable candidate for Universal Memory [7-8]. Figure 1.1 shows the STTRAM cell 
schematic, where the Magnetic Tunnel Junction (MTJ) is used as the storage element. The MTJ 
contains a free layer and a pinned magnetic layer. The resistance of the MTJ stack is high (low) if 
free layer magnetic orientation is anti-parallel (parallel) compared to the fixed layer. The 
configuration of the MTJ can be changed from parallel to anti-parallel (or vice versa) by injecting 
current from source-line to bitline (or vice versa). The spin-torque transfer phenomena for reversal 
of magnetization in free layer reduce the write power compared to conventional MRAM. 
 
Figure 1.1  Schematic of STTRAM bitcell showing MTJ 
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1.2 STTRAM Vulnerabilities 
Although STTRAM is a promising memory technology, it brings in an important security 
concern. It is susceptible to contactless tampering efforts, e.g. by subjecting it to strong external 
magnetic field, an adversary can corrupt stored contents. The fixed layer of STTRAM is robust. 
However, the free layer could be toggled through both spin polarized current as well as magnetic 
field.  
The free layer is susceptible to both the magnitude and polarity of external magnetic field 
it is subjected to. The motivation of tampering for an adversary is to corrupt the data or steal 
information. This could prevent STTRAMs application to a wide range of mobile devices. Figure 
1.2 and 1.3 shows that the MTJ free layer could flip its polarity either using current or with 250Oe 
magnetic field. The magnetic field produced by a common horseshoe magnet is ~350 Oe [3] which 
is sufficient to flip the weak bits in presence of process variations and thermal noise. Note that 
although we take STTRAM as motivational case study, other forms of magnetic memories such 
as MRAM, Domain Wall Memory (DWM) and Ferroelectric RAM (FRAM) [4] is also expected 
to experience similar issues, and hence vulnerable to tampering attacks. The ease of tampering the 
data using low-cost commercially available magnets underscores the need of quantifying the 
impact of magnetic attack and exploring effective, low-overhead protection mechanisms [5].  
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Figure 1.2 Flipping of MTJ free layer due to STT (Happ=0Oe, I=0.638mA) 
 
 
Figure 1.3 Flipping due to external magnetic field (Happ=260Oe, I=0).  
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This thesis provides an in-depth analysis of the vulnerability issues related to STTRAM 
and propose an on-chip sensor based on replica of a memory in order to accurately detect the 
magnitude and polarity of an attack. In summary, we make following contributions in this thesis, 
• We investigate the impact of magnetic attack on an STTRAM array. We consider both Direct 
Current (DC) and Alternating Current (AC) attack modes.   
• We propose an array-based sensor to detect the magnitude and polarity of an attack. The sensor 
array is deliberately designed to be more sensitive to attack (than the memory core) by reducing 
the free-layer volume and weak write.    
• We monitor the bit error rate (BER) of sensor array and take proactive steps to mitigate the 
attack. Our investigation reveals that retention mode is robust to attack. Therefore, we propose 
array retention during attack. 
• Finally, we present a dynamic error-rate dependent variable-strength ECC to mitigate the bit 
failures due to attacks. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we present the magnetic 
properties and the background on MTJ. In Chapter 3, we present the magnetic attack model and 
introduce the magnetic field sensor design. The on-chip compensation and correction methodology 
are proposed in Chapter 4. Overall simulation results are presented in Chapter 5. Finally, the 
conclusions are drawn in Chapter 6. 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: MAGNETIC ATTACK ON STTRAM2 
 
In this chapter, we present the attack model, quantify the impact on memory stability, and 
describe the impact of process variation. Additionally, we describe the design of a novel tamper 
detection sensor for magnetic memory based on a memory replica (similar to critical path replicas 
that monitor path delay variables in a chip). 
2.1 Background on MTJ 
The magnetization orientation of the pinned layer is fixed using an aniti-ferromagnetic 
coupling and it cannot be changed using nominal current or external magnetic field. Contrary to 
this, the free layer could be toggled by passing current or by applying magnetic field. The 
magnetization dynamics of the MTJ free layer is governed by LLG equation [6]. 


= −	 ×  − 	 × 	 × 
  
+ ℏ (")
$
	 × (	 × %&)
'((  
     (1) 
where  m is unit vectors representing local magnetic moment, Is is spin current, G(ψ) is the 
transmission co-efficient, ℏ is reduced planck’s constant, α is Gilbert damping parameter and e+ 
is the unit vector along fixed layer magnetization. The effective field is represented by H-- =
H. + H/ + H + H0, where Ha is applied field, Hk is anisotropy field, Hd is demagnetization field 
and Hex is exchange field.  
                                                           
2 Portions of this chapter were previously published in [16]. Permissions is included in Appendix A. 
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In STTRAM the writing of MTJ is done using STT term (for low power consumption) and 
external field Ha is kept 0. However, Ha  can also be used to toggle the magnetization in absence 
of charge current (field term, eq (1)). Note that magnetic field-based toggling is the foundation of 
MRAM. The attacker can exploit this extra knob to corrupt the free layer data. Both permanent 
magnet as well as electromagnet could be used for tampering by the adversary. 
2.2 Attack Model 
The attacks on STTRAM could be launched either through static (DC) magnetic field or 
alternating (AC) magnetic field.  The DC attack is less detrimental as it can only create unipolar 
failures. For example, a magnetic field will cause failures only for the bits whose free layer 
orientation is opposite to the applied field. However, the AC field could cause more damage as it 
will affect both storage polarities. Due to ease of AC field generation using a low-cost 
electromagnet this type of attack is highly likely.  
The attack could be launched either during ideal (retention) mode or functional mode 
(read/write). Note that read current is unipolar irrespective to the storage polarity whereas write 
current polarity is data dependent. The impact of attack during functional mode (especially read) 
could be more detrimental than retention due to two factors: (a) presence of disturb current; and, 
(b) higher frequency of reads compared to writes. Both storage polarity will be affected under AC 
attack. During write operation, the AC field will either assist if the current polarity matches with 
the magnetic field or suppress the attack if the current polarity is opposite to applied field. In all 
of the above scenarios the attack could either manifest as hard failure (i.e., flipping of bitcell 
content) or soft failure (i.e., delay in write or degraded sense margin). The soft failures could be 
mitigated by slowing down the read/write operation but the hard failures need to be avoided or 
corrected through error correction.   
 8 
The frequency of the magnetic field is important in the context of failures in functional 
mode. If the AC field frequency is faster than the write time then it can affect writing both data 
polarities. Similarly it can also affect both storage polarities during read operation. If the frequency 
of AC field is slow then the impact will be less harmful. 
2.3 Attack Analysis 
We use publicly available micro-magnetic simulator OOMMF [9] to analyze the impact of 
DC and AC magnetic field tampering on the integrity of STTRAM. The MTJ parameters used for 
sim is shown in Table 1. It can be noted from Figure 2.1 that the MTJ polarity could be flipped in 
retention mode. The flip time reduces with increasing strength of magnetic field. The impact of 
AC field is plotted in Figure 2.2. For this simulation we have used a sinusoidal field and varied the 
frequency from 150MHz to 2GHz. It can be observed that higher frequency AC field can cause 
more damage even with smaller amplitude than lower frequency AC field and higher amplitude.  
Table 1. MTJ Parameters 
Parameter Value 
Dimension 60nmx120nmx3nm 
damping const (α) 0.01 
Sat. Mag. (Ms) 1000 A/m 
Exchange Constant (A) 2e-11 J/m. 
Polarization 0.8 
Spin conductance 1e-3 
Activation energy (Ea) 56kT 
Anisotropy const (Ku) Ea/volume 
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Figure 2.2 Impact of magnetic field on the stability of free-layer: The flipping time reduces 
with AC magnetic field 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Impact of magnetic field on the stability of free-layer: The flipping time reduces 
with DC magnetic field 
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The comparison of MTJ stability between retention and functional mode is considered in 
Figure 2.3-4. For the analysis we have assumed different magnitudes of read/write currents and 
polarities for both DC and AC fields. For DC field, it can be observed that the bits can fail easily 
when the current polarity and magnetic field are in the same direction (assistive). The flip time is 
higher when current and magnetic field are in opposite direction (suppressive). Similar observation 
also holds true for AC field.   
The stability of MTJ free layer is a function of its volume. Therefore it is possible to 
enhance the robustness of the MTJ against tampering by increasing the size. For this simulation 
we have swept the MTJ thickness from 3nm to 0.5nm. Figure 2.5 plots the flip time with respect 
to the volume of free layer for DC attack. It can be observed that the bitcell is able to withstand 
weak magnetic attack with higher volume. However, it fails to provide protection against strong 
attack (>400Oe). The simulation results for AC attack (Figure 2.6) indicate that higher volume can 
protect against attack of lower frequency. High frequency attack can cause failure regardless of 
MTJ volume.  
  
Figure 2.3 Impact of functional operation on the flip time in presence of assistive current 
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Figure 2.4 Impact of functional operation on the flip time in presence of suppressing current 
  
Figure 2.5 Impact of MTJ volume on the flip time in presence of DC magnetic field 
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2.4 Impact of Process Variation 
For the large caches, process variation in MTJ and access transistor can modulate the 
failure characteristics in presence of tampering. Process variation is also crucial for sensor design 
and detection of strength of attack. In this work we have considered the variations in access 
transistor and MTJ volume. The access transistor variation is lumped in threshold voltage 
variation. The (mean, sigma) of VTH variation is assumed to be (0, 50mV). The volume variation 
(mean, sigma) is assumed to be (0, 5%). The LLG model [10-11] is ported to verilogA (after 
calibration with OOMMF) and used for fast circuit simulation. The impact of variations on failures 
during retention as well as functional mode are evaluated. A total of 5000 Monte Carlo points are 
simulated for analysis. 
  
Figure 2.6 Impact of MTJ volume on the flip time in presence of AC magnetic field 
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Figure 2.7-8 shows the mean and sigma of flip time for different strength of DC magnetic 
field. For functional mode we have considered 50uA, 250uA and 500uA initial assistive current 
using a voltage source. It can be noted that mean flip time reduces in functional mode due to more 
disturbance. Interestingly the sigma increases because the process variations in MTJ and access 
transistor modulates the current which in turn affects the flip time. This plot also indicates that the 
bitcells are more robust to attack in retention mode regardless of variability. This feature can be 
exploited for mitigating the impact of attack (Chapter 3). The functional mode (read/write) 
amplifies the impact of variability and results in random bit errors. 
 
  
Figure 2.7 Impact of process variations on flip time during retention and function mode (mean) 
 
  
Figure 2.8 Impact of process variations on flip time during retention and function mode (sigma) 
 14 
2.5 Tamper Detection Sensor 
 
2.5.1 Sensor Design 
 
The key objective of the proposed sensor is to sense or detect magnetic field attack 
‘proactively’ in order to trigger corrective steps for the functional STTRAM array. Therefore, the 
sensor can avoid wrong operation of memory under magnetic field attacks through compensation 
and appropriate error correction that tailors the error correction capability to the intensity of the 
external magnetic field. The sensor should be able to sense an attack ahead of time, i.e. before the 
memory corruption. It can also sense: (a) the intensity of the attack; and (b) the polarity of the 
attack, both of which can be useful in auto-protecting a memory subsystem against data corruption.  
We use a small replica of the STTRAM array as a sensor. Although functionally equivalent 
to the actual array, the sensor is designed to meet the objectives described above. The sensor is 
embedded in the array (in the peripheral areas) to capture the spatial variation in magnetic attack 
(Figure 2.9). The sensor array is designed by modifying the actual STTRAM array. The intensity 
of the attack is sensed through the error rate of the sensor array. High error rate corresponds to 
higher intensity.  
  
Figure 2.9 Embedded attack sensor in memory array. The details of sensor array with peripheral 
circuits is shown in inset. Control logic is shared among the subarrays and contains the logic to 
generate address, read, write and data and analyze the response. 
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The proposed sensors have following salient features to quantify the intensity and polarity of 
attack:  
(a) Multiple copies with different free layer volumes: Multiple copies of sensor each with 
different MTJ free layer volumes e.g., small and medium will be employed. The objective of 
changing the MTJ sizes is to sense the attack even in presence of process variation.  
(b) Distribution of sensors: These different flavors of sensors can be distributed in the 
cache to collect the spatial responses.  
(c) Weak writing/stress: This technique lowers the activation energy of MTJ so that it fails 
early. The weak writing could be accommodated by using Design-for-Test (DFT) circuit to keep 
the write drivers active and bias the wordline voltages appropriately to tune the bitcell current 
(Figure 2.9). The column multiplexers are kept ON to enable weak writing of all columns.  
(d) Array architecture: The sensor array is always kept ON (during functional and retention 
mode) to sense the attack. The total number of global columns is kept 1 to lower area, power 
overhead (especially for weak write sensors) and faster test time. The column area contains sense 
amplifier and write driver and row area contains minimal sizes wordline driver that is modified to 
provide biased voltages to access transistors. 
 (e) Data polarity: Different data polarities could be stored in the sensor array to detect the 
direction of attack. One example is to store block 1’s (0’s) in the sensor to detect DC attack in 
negative (positive) direction. Block 1 and 0 pattern will capture unidirectional fails. Checkerboard 
pattern could be stored to detect AC attack (to capture bidirectional fails).       
(f) Test speed and compensation window: The test is executed in parallel with stressing of 
neighboring sensor arrays (for weak write sensors). For test, first the stressing of the array and 
weak assertion of wordline is paused. Next, read followed by write is performed to re-initialize the 
 16 
bits. The error rate determines the magnitude of attack. The test speed determines the amount of 
time left for launching the compensation. For example, if the bits fail 100ns before the real bits 
and test takes 25ns then the time available to enable mitigation techniques (which is compensation 
window) is 75ns.    
(g) Control logic: The control logic resides in midlogic area and generates address, 
read/write signals and data and, collects responses to determine error rate from various sensor 
flavors (Figure 2.9). 
(h) Power saving: Note that weak writing of bits may cause significant power overhead. 
To harness the benefit of early attack detection while lowering the power consumption, the sensors 
with weak write (sensor-w) could be (a) interleaved with normal sensors (sensor-n); and, (b) turned 
on periodically.  
2.5.2 Simulation Results 
 
Figures 2.10 and 2.11 show the sensitivity of free layer volume with respect to the flip time 
of DC attack. It can be noted that flip time is very sensitive to free layer volume for lower magnetic 
field attack. A 33% lower volume reduces the flip time by 2X (for 220Oe). For lower fields 
(<200Oe) the sensitivity is exponential. We compute the flip time difference between functional 
MTJs and sensor MTJs and plot them in Figure 2.11. For lower fields we extrapolate the flip time 
difference. The sensor MTJ uses 33% lower volume (sensor-n). The results indicate that a 50Oe 
attack could be detected ~100ns before the real bits is corrupted. For weak attacks (<10Oe) the 
sensor can detect it ~1us in advance. By adding 50uA of current (for sensor-w) the sensitivity 
could be improved by ~80X at the cost of extra power overhead. An additional 50uA can improve 
the sensitivity by an additional 2X.  
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From above discussion it is evident that volume modulation and weak writing can be 
effectively employed to create two flavors of sensor arrays. Additional sensor flavors can be 
created by lowering MTJ volume further and/or combining weak write. Assuming 4 local columns 
and 128 rows per sensor array, the weak writing could cause 25mW power (at 1V) for sensor-w. 
Therefore, sensor-w should be judiciously used (by limiting their number and frequency of usage). 
The area overhead of the proposed sensors are less than 1% since they are embedded in the 
transition region of the arrays.  
 
  
Figure 2.10 Sensitivity free layer volume on flip time. 33% reduction in volume reduces flip 
time by 2X. 
  
Figure 2.11 Effectiveness of volume scaling and weak write on early detection of attack. 
Reduction of 33% volume can detect 50Oe attack ~100ns before actual array fails. Weak write 
of 50uA can provide 80X more time. An additional 50uA can provide 2X extra time.    
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CHAPTER 3: ON-CHIP COMPENSATION
3
 
 
The sensor proposed in the previous section is used to sense polarity and intensity of attack 
and trigger two types of compensation mechanisms namely, array sleep and variable strength ECC.  
3.1 Computation Methodology 
Figure 3.1 shows the top level schematic of the proposed sensing and compensation 
methodology. The attack could be DC as well as AC and the magnitude could vary temporally and 
spatially. To capture the spatial variation we distribute the sensors along the array. The temporal 
variation is captured using sensitive sensor-w and regular sensor-n. The error rate and failing 
polarities collected from sensors are provided to a control unit that triggers compensation 
techniques. Due to proactive sensing, the control unit can trigger precautionary measures to 
improve the array resilience against the tampering.   
                                                           
3 Portions of this chapter were previously published in [16]. Permissions is included in Appendix A. 
 
  
Figure 3.1 Overall system protection approach that includes an STTRAM array with embedded 
sensors, attack mitigation, and variable-strength ECC. 
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3.2 Array Sleep 
From Section IID it is evident that the STTRAM bits are more robust to attack in retention 
mode than functional mode of operation. Therefore, the array can be put in retention mode till the 
attack subsides. Although simple, this technique may result in performance loss due to stall and 
may still experience attack induced corruption of bits. For further resilience, this technique can be 
combined with adaptive strength ECC to ensure strong encoding before the enabling sleep and 
correction after wake-up (Chapter 4). Note that reading, encoding and writing the bits is associated 
with significant power overhead. Therefore this technique should be combined with appropriate 
application where only the “important” segment of cache could be protected to ensure quality-of-
service requirement. 
3.3 Variable-Strength ECC 
In addition to on-chip electromagnet, variable-strength ECC is used to correct failures in 
STTRAM. The proposed ECC can provide variable error correction capability to STTRAM array 
based on the strength of magnetic field attack. The variable-strength ECC can dynamically change 
error correction capability to provide the right amount of error protection to individual memory 
blocks against failures.  In order to enhance the multi-bit tolerance scheme, we used Bose-
Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem (BCH) cyclic code with 128 bit data-length. The variable-strength ECC 
offers four different error correction capabilities (1bit/ 2bit/ 4bit/ 8bit), and the correction 
capability can be automatically adapted based on the intensity/polarity of the magnetic attack 
measured in the tamper detection sensor. When there is no magnetic attack, ECC can be completely 
turned off or it can be working with simplest ECC (1 bit correction). As the magnitude of attack is 
becoming intense, which can be measured at detection sensor, the control unit in Figure 3.2(a) can 
adapt ECC to provide stronger error corrections (2bit/ 4bit/ 8bit corrections).  When smaller error 
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correction options are selected, the unused modules in the ECC can be easily turned off to save 
computation energy.  
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Figure 3.2 Variable-strength ECC architecture (a) BCH decoding process,  (b) An example of 
scalable syndrome generator, (c) Dynamic reconfiguration scheme applied to syndrome 
generator using turning-off gate [12].  
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 (a) Variable-strength ECC encoder: BCH encoder is composed of two parts, Galois field 
adders and dividers. The division part is designed according to generate polynomial g(x), and 
different error correction BCH encoders generally have different generator polynomial g(x). Four 
different division parts are used in the reconfigurable encoder (1bit / 2bit / 4bit/ 8bit). The area 
overhead of the different division parts is small since the area of BCH encoder is much smaller 
(around 5 %) than that of decoder. 
(b) Variable-strength ECC decoder: The VC-ECC decoder is basically similar to 8 bit 
correction BCH decoder. However, the architectures are designed scalable such that simple control 
logics can easily turn off the unused modules when the correction capability is 1 or 2 or 4 or 8 bits.  
First, the syndrome generator of the VC-ECC decoder is similar to that of 8bit correction 
BCH. As shown in Figure 3.2(b), since the syndrome generator for 1bit, 2bit or 4 bit correction 
BCH can be expressed as a subset of syndrome generator for 8 bit correction BCH [13], the 
architecture is scalable, which means that only 12.5 %, 25 % or 50 % of syndrome generators can 
be utilized with simple control logic to generate the syndromes for 1 bit, 2 bit or 4 bit correction 
BCH, respectively. Key equation solver (KES) and Chien search modules can be designed scalable 
like Syndrome generator, and the unused module can be simple turned off using the turning-off 
Table 2. Hardware Implementation Results of VC ECC 
BCH Type
1Bit Cor.
BCH
2Bit Cor.
BCH
4Bit Cor.
BCH
Reconfi.
BCH
Total area 
(Gate counts)
Critical path
# of Cycles
10298
6ns
4
18887
6ns
6
37407
6ns
3/4/6/10
6108
6ns
3
2.46 3.87 1.78/2.55/4.13/6.351.62
8bit Cor.
BCH
36557
6ns
10
6.21Power (mW)
Parity bits 16 32 8/16/32/488 48
 
 
 22 
scheme. The turning-off scheme applied to Syndrome generator is illustrated in Figure 3.3(c). 
Simple pull-up and pull-down transistors with correct dimensions is being used based on whether 
1-bit, 2-bit, 4-bit or 8-bit correction scheme is being exercised. The pull-down NMOS transistor is 
required to ensure that the syndrome generator modules provide ‘zero’ output when unused for 
correct ECC functionality. Details of the power-gate inclusion were obtained from [12].  
The proposed variable-strength ECC decoder is implemented using 65-nm standard-cell 
CMOS library, and Table 2 shows the implementation results. Separate 1-bit (Hamming), 2-bit, 4-
bit and 8-bit correction BCH decoders are also implemented for comparison. The power 
consumptions of various BCH decoders are measured at 100MHz, 1.2V with spice-level 
simulations using 1000 input data. As the error correction capability increases, the area 
requirement is understandably larger. The additional area for turning-off gates and control logic 
are accounted for in the results presented in Table 2. The area overhead of the proposed variable 
ECC is not significant compared to 8-bit correction BCH decoder.  
 (c) Dynamic adaptation scheme: The proposed variable-strength ECC has four choices of 
error correction capabilities, and the correction mode can be controlled using 2 bit mode selection 
signal as shown in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2(c). This mode selection signal is generated from 
control logic, and the information is updated at runtime on a regular basis by monitoring the 
magnetic attack strength at temper detection sensor. When the strength of attack becomes larger, 
the dynamic adaptation scheme can change mode selection signal to offer stronger error correction 
capabilities. For protection of on-chip cache memory, the 2-bit mode selection is stored per cache 
block to indicate the encoding type, and the number of ways to store ECC bits is dynamically 
adjusted during runtime [14]. The two bit overhead for the mode selection storage is negligible (< 
0.3% area overhead) considering a typical cache block size (e.g. 512bits). If we cannot correct a 
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block due to inadequate correction capability, then we can set its dirty bit and fetch it from the next 
level. If we're using the memory as last level of memory, then even higher protection is needed. In 
the proposed ECC, another way of checking the occurrence of STTRAM failures by ECC itself is 
to monitor the outputs of syndrome generator since any non-zero syndrome indicates memory 
failure occurrence. This syndrome monitoring scheme can be used to check the frequency of 
STTRAM failures in the functional mode.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
4
 
 
Table 3 shows BER results when variable-strength ECC is applied to STTRAM cells which 
are under attack with various strength of magnetic fields. Input vector with 108 bit is used for the 
BER simulations. In the table, magnetic attack strength of 76.9Oe 100μA means that 76.9Oe is 
combined with 100μA current to model active operation mode. According to the results, when the 
magnetic attack strength of 76.8Oe 100μA is used, STTRAM cells show raw BER of 3*10-3. In 
this case, ECC with 4 bit corrections (t=4) can be selected to correct STTRAM bit failures. When 
the attack strength is as large as 76.9Oe 500μA, the STTRAM raw BER is too large (9.7*10-1) that 
the failures cannot be corrected even with 8 bit correctable ECC. However, the proposed adaptive 
ECC scheme using BCH codes can detect any number of failures by checking the output of the 
syndrome generator (i.e. all zero means no failure). If we detect bit failures which are too many to 
correct by the current ECC, then we can invalidate the corresponding cache blocks, thus preventing 
use of wrong data.   
The information in Table 3 can be used for array sleep when the magnetic attack strength 
can be proactively determined. For example, when the predicted attack strength is around 76.7Oe 
100μA, the ECC correction capability (t) of the proposed variable-strength ECC can be decided as 
t=2. Then, the memory data is read out, re-encoded to match the correction capability of ECC to 
the level of external field and written back to memory before it goes to array sleep. 
                                                           
4 Portions of this chapter were previously published in [16]. Permission is included in Appendix A. 
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Table 3. Bit Error Rates (BERs) VC ECC is Applied to STTRAM Cells Attacked with Various 
Strengths of Magnetic Fields.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS
5
 
 
We demonstrated the possibility of a contactless tampering using common magnet or 
electromagnet on STTRAM for the first time. Our analysis indicated that an adversary can achieve 
significant success in destroying the data by creating a strong external magnetic field, which can 
be accomplished even with low-cost publicly accessible magnets. We quantified the impact of 
such attack using a widely used micro-magnetic simulation framework from NIST. Next, we have 
presented a novel sensor based on memory replica that can detect memory corruption due to such 
an attack ahead of time along with the intensity and polarity of a magnetic field attack. Finally, we 
have presented two low-overhead effective design solutions to mitigate the attack, namely, (1) 
array sleep; and (2) variable strength Error Correction Code (ECC) that can dynamically adapt its 
correction capability. Both protection approaches rely on the sensor’s output – e.g., the variable 
ECC dynamically adapts error protection based on sensed intensity of the filed. These solutions 
together can provide high level of protection against such attacks. They solutions can also be 
effective to counter effect of naturally-present (non-malicious) magnetic field induced failures in 
specific applications (e.g. geo-thermal exploration). Future work will include further optimization 
of sensor design, analysis of other forms of contactless tampering attacks (e.g. with an 
electromagnetic field), and investigation of similar attacks in other forms of memory (e.g. resistive 
or phase change memory).   
 
                                                           
5 Portions of this chapter were previously published in [16]. Permission is included in Appendix A. 
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